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CONTRACTS, CONTROL AND CHARTER SCHOOLS:
THE SUCCESS OF CHARTER SCHOOLS DEPENDS ON
STRONGER NONPROFIT BOARD ÜVERSIGHT TO
PRESERVE lNDEPENDENCE AND PREVENT
DOMINATION BY FOR-PROFIT MANAGEMENT
COMPANIES

Julia L. Davis·

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. "Education Entrepreneurs" and Charter School Control
A recent New York Times article profiled energy executive
Dennis Bakke and his wife Eileen, who, after retiring from his
business, decided to enter the world of commercial charter
schools "to experiment wi.th applying business strategies and
discipline to public schools." 1 The couple's company, Imagine
Schools, is now the largest for-profit manager of charter schools
in the country. 2 The piece was less than glowing and revealed
a number of government officials and disgruntled charter
school board members who reported the company's attempts to
dominate and control their communities' non-profit charter
schools. 3
Imagine is not the only commercial charter school manager,
known in the education world as an education management
organization ("EM0"). 4 Companies like Mosaica Education

* Julia L. Davis, .J.D., is an Associate at Venable, LLI' in New York. She is a
graduate of Brown University and the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. She wishes
to thank her husband, a New York City teacher, for his thoughtful insights offered on
this topic.
1. Stephanie Strom, For Charter School Company, lssues of Spending and
Control, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 2010, atA 1.
2. ld.
:3. ld.
4. NAT'L CHAitTER SCH. RESEARCH l'RO,JECT, CTR. ON REINVENTJNG Pun. EDUC.,
DANIEL ,J. EVANS SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UN!V. OF WASH., QUANTITY COUNTS: THE
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Inc., Edison Schools, Inc., Charter Schools USA, White Hat
Management and Chancellor Beacon Academies (which merged
with Imagine in 2004) now manage between nine and twelve
percent of all charter schools in the U.S. 5 Imagine's recent bad
press is emblematic of the problems with for-profit companies
managing charter schools that are emerging across the
country. 6 As the Times notes, "[R]egulators ... have found
that Imagine has elbowed the charter holders out of virtually
all school decision making - hiring and firing staff members,
controlling and profiting from school real estate, and rctaining
fees under contracts, which often guarantee Imagine's
management in perpetuity." 7 Imagine's methods, which are
not unlike those of other management companies discussed in
detail in this paper, unapologetically flout traditional nonprofit
law by co-opting independent non-profit charter school boards
who are their clients and creating obvious conflicts of interest
in the financial operations of the schools they manage.
According to the former president of the National Charter
Schools Alliance (which is now defunct), "'Imagine works to
dominate the board of the charter holder, and then it does a
deal with the board it dominates- and that cannot be an arm's
length transaction."'R The District of Columbia Charter School
Board, which grants and oversees charters in Washington, said
that it had "concerns about who was running thc show" at an
Imagine-managed school in the city, and remarked more
broadly, "'it is very hard for schools that hire management
companies to maintain their independence, and chartcr schools
are supposed to be independent."' 9 According to the sarne
G!(OWTH OF CHAR'n;l( SCHOOL MANAGEMENT ÜIWANIZATIONS (J\ug. 2007), auailable at
http://www .crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr iiles/pu b ncsrp_ quancoun t _aug07. pdf
[hereinafter NA'I''L CHARTim SCH. lü:SEAI{CH I'I((J.JECTj. The author uses the terms
"EMO" and "for-profit managemcnt company" intL:rchangcably in this papcr.
5. Quantity Counts: The Growth of Charter Sclwol Management Urganizations.
U.S. CHAI('['ER SCHOOLS. http://www.uscharterscbools.org/cs/r/view/uscs_rs/2:l11 (last
visited Oct. 20, 2010) ("For-profit education managl,mlmt organizations (EMOs) and
nonprofit chartcr manageml,nt organizations (CMOs) rupn,scnt a small but growing
portion (approximatL,Jy [nine] perccnt) of chartcr schools nationally."): Frank R.
Kemercr & Catherine Maloney, The I~egal Frameworh for l~ducational l'rivatization
and Accountahility, 150 Enuc. L. HEI'. 589, 605 (2001) (twclvc pcrccnt of chartcr
schools are opl'ratcd by private organizations).
6. Greg Richmond, Who's in Charge at Charter Schools~ Six Criteria for
gnsuring the Quality of Gouerning Boards, EllUC. WK., .July 12, 201 O.
7. Strom, supra note 2.
8. ld.
9.

Jd.
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education official, the "entire model of using management
companies is flawed." 10 Indeed, the New York State legislature
recently prohibited charter schools from hiring for-profit
companies to manage schools. 11
ln Texas, parents who were attempting to create a charter
school with Imagine found that the company "'thought the
charter belonged to them."' 12 ln a damning email sent by
Imagine's founder to senior staff, Mr. Bakke reminded bis
executives that the management company is "responsible for
making big decisions about budget matters, school policies,
hiring of the principal and dozens of other matters." 13 "It is our
school, our money and our risk, not theirs." 14 Press reports like
these have damaged the credibility of the charter school
movement, and raised questions about the appropriate role of
EMOs and the proper oversight of government officials and
legislators. Some commentators have called for a prohibition on
for-profit EMOs managing charter schools altogether because
of "inherent" conflicts between the goals of public education
and for-profit business. 15
A new funding initiative called Race to the Top, created by
the Obama administration, raises the stakes for charter schools
by tying vast amounts of federal education grants to states'
lifting caps on the number of charter schools they permit. 16 ln
the face of financial crisis, many states are scrambling to dose
state education budget shortfalls. Some are closing schools,
laying off teachers, and searching for other sources of
revenue. 17 ln this context, states have significant incentives to
relax the barriers to charter schools in arder to obtain millions
in federal aid. ln New York, for example, the legislature
significantly increased the cap on charter schools from 200 to
lO. ld.
11. New York State Senate Bill i\11810.
12. Strom, supra note 2 (quoting Karelei Munn).
1:l. i\ssociated l'ress. Chartcr School Operator Accused, THE ,JOURNAL GAZETTE,
Oct.
25,
2009,
auailable at
http://www.journalgazette.net/articlc/200911 02/
LOCAL 10/911 029966/1216/LOCi\L 1006.
11. ld.
15. Kathlecn Conn, F'or-Profit School Manaf{ement Corporations: Seruing the
Wronf? Master, :ll .J.L. & EDUC. 129, 117 (2002).
16. LJ.S. ]);:PARTMENT OF EDUCATION, RACE TO THE TOP EXECUTlVE SUMMARY 11
(2009), auailablc at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/raeetothetop/executive-summary.pdf
1 7. See, e.f{., l{honda Holman, Editorial, Statc's Shortfall Stretchinf{ Schools, THE
W!CHITA EA<:LE, Dce. 1:l, 2009, auailable at http://www.kansas.com/2009/
12/1 :l/1 09621 0/states-shortfall-stretching-schools.html.
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460 state-wide following its failure to win $700 million in Race
to the Top funds during the first round of the competitive
application process in arder to make thc state eligible to
reapply. 18
This is a criticai time for charter schools as they are
increasingly held by politicians and the public as a solution for
failing public schools. 19 ln addition to federal support, charter
schools have attracted the interest of private philanthropists
and foundations. 20 Even the once hostil e teachers' unions are
finding a role to play in charter school educa tion. 21 Wha t was
an experiment of the early 1990s is now increasingly part of
the fabric of public education throughout the United States.
Scrutiny has followed.
While most research has focused on determining whether
charter schools produce better academic achievement for
students, anecdotal information from the press, the courts, and
the Internal Revenue Service reveals an emerging problematic
by-product of the movement's reliance on private organizations
and competition-namely improper domination of nonprofit
charter school boards by for-profit management companies. 22
Scholarly critique has focused on some of the constraints placed
on EMOs to ensure they put pupils before profits, but little has
been written about the risks that face nonprofit schools that
contract with EMOs or the appropriate role charter school
boards should play to ensure schools serve students and the
community with public dollars.
For charter schools to meet the requirements of
accountability and financial stewardship that their use of
public funds requires, the relationships betwcen nonprofit
charter school boards and management companies must
radically change. State and federal reforms are necessary to
promote school independence, bolster credibility in the charter
school movement generally, and prevent charter school

18. Jennifer Medina, Statc Senate Approucs !Jill to /ncrease Charter Schuols, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4. 2010, at A28.
19. Amanda Ripley, Waiting for "Superman": A Call to Action for Our Schouls,
TIM"; MAGAZINE, September 2:3, 2010. at 1.
20. Nancy Hass, Scholarly Jnuestments, N.Y. TIMES, Dl•:c. 6, 2009, Nl' S'l'1.
21. Sam Dillon, As More Charter Schools Unionize, Educators /Jebate lhe l~ffect,
N.Y. TIMES, ,July 27,2009, atAl.
22. Sec, e.g., Richmond, supra note 7.
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domination by EMOs in jurisdictions where they are permitted
to operate.
This paper seeks to: (1) describe and analyze how the IRS,
two states' legislatures, and courts have recently attempted to
limit the control of management companies over nonprofit
charter schools; (2) demonstrate the limitations and
weaknesses of the current state of the law and, (3) recommend
areas for rulemaking at the state and federal levei to help
nonprofit charter-holding organizations attain effective
oversight of for-profit management companies and to protect
them from the threat of tax exemption revocation and
intermediate sanctions for excess benefit transactions.

B.

A Brief History of the Charter School Mouement

The charter school movement in the United States is nearly
twenty years old 23 and its history reflects a generation of
struggle among a broad range of stakeholders to improve the
education available to the country's youth. 24 Today, there are
over 4,000 charter schools (also known in some states as
"community schools") serving more than 1.2 million school-aged
children in 40 states. 25 Roughly three percent of school-aged
children attend a charter school. 26
Charter schools are public schools that enjoy freedom from
some of the state regulation that traditional public schools
must follow; 27 however, as creatures of state legislation,
charter schools must nonetheless follow state guidelines. 28
Generally, state law requires an organization seeking to start a
school to make an application for a charter from a state or local
education authority (e.g., a school board or a state regent) in
2il. History,
USCHARTEitSCHOOI,S.ORC:,
http://www.uscharterschools.org/puh/
uscs_docs/o/history.htm (iast visitcd Oct. 20, 2010).
21. See, e.g., .James Forman, ,Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten l'ublic l~ducation?
f;~merging f;~uidence From Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Marhet for Schooling, 2007 U. ]LL. L.
REV. 8:19 (2007).
25. USCS State Profiles, US CHARTim SCHOOLS, http://www.uscharterschools.org/
cs/sp/query/q/1595 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). Sincc 1991, when Minnesota passed the
first chartcr schoollegislation, 10 states, thc District of Columbia and l'uerto Hico have
sigm'd into law chartcr school legislation (AK, AH, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DC, DE, FL, GA,
Hl, ID, IL, lN, IA, KS, LA, MA, MD, MI, MN, MO, MS, NC, NH, N.J, NM, NV, NY, OH,
OK, OR, I'A, !'!{, ]{], SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, Wl, WY). States in which a charter school
law has not heen passed include: AL, KY, ME, MT, NO, NE, SD, VT, WA, and WV. ld.
26. NNr'L CHAWI'Eit SCH. i{ESEARCH J'I(().JECT, supra note 5, at il.
27. History, supra note 21.
28. ld.
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order to receive public education funding. 29 The charter, if
granted, is a kind of contract that outlines the obligations of
the school and the expectations of the granting governmental
body. 30 The charter may include a mutually-accepted mission
for the school, details regarding the scope of the curriculum
and any special area of focus, the students to be recruited (and
whether the school may restrict access in any way through an
application or residence requirement, or whether it is "open
enrollment"), and indicators for determining whether the
school is meeting its academic goals. 31 Because charter schools
are encouraged by state governments as a "laboratory" for
education innovation, the charter is typically granted for a few
years before it becomes ripe for renewal by the sponsor,
permitting schools some time to develop before formal
evaluation to determine whether they should continue. 32
According to proponents, "charter schools ... exercise increased
autonomy in return for ... [academic and fiscal] accountability"
to "the sponsor that grants them [a charterj, the parents who
choose them, and the public that funds them." 33
The ideas behind charter schools can be traced to education
reform efforts beginning in the 1970s, 34 as well as broader
trends to privatize government services more generally. 35 ln
1991, Minnesota passed the first charter schoollaw, followed a
year later by California. 36 Charter schools have been a darling
of both democrat and republican leadership, and among federal
and state officials. 37 Charter schools appeal to ideological views
on the right (school "choice," market forces, competition,
efficiency in government through out-sourcing) and the left
(curriculum reform, community control and access to quality
public education, especially for low-income and minority

29. ld.
30. Id.
i11. fd.
il2. Id.
ilil. ld.
il4. Jd.
i35. For a discussion of the history hehind early arguments for privatization of
puhlic education based on theories of government monopoly and the power of markds,
see Lewis D. Solomon, Edison Schools and the l'rivatization o( K- 12 l'u.blic l~du.cation:
A Le{{al and Policy Analysis, ilO FOH.IlHAI\1 UIW. L .•J. 1281, l:l:J!l (200:1).
:16. History, supra note 21.
:l7. fd.
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students). 3 K This, however, does not mean that the movement
has been without vocal detractors. 39 Nonetheless, the federal
government has provided incentives for charter school creation
under No Child Left Behind, which provides grants for failing
public schools to reorganize as charter schools. 40 Other federal
funds are also available to charter schools, including new
initiatives ofthe Obama administration. 41 Venture capital and
private philanthropy is also a significant supporter of charter
schools, bringing hundreds of millions of dollars into a
landscape that has attracted management companies. 42

C.

Management Companies in Charter School Education

Organizations and individuais seeking to create a charter
school are usually grassroots nonprofits and parents, teachers
and community leaders, entrepreneurs, or existing public or
private schools converting to charter status. 43 The majority of
charter schools in the U.S. are nonprofit organizations; 44
however, in a handful of states for-profit schools may receive a
charter to contract directly with the state or local government
to provide public education. 45 Even in states where for-profit
:l8. Scc, e.g, Bipartisan Support for Charter Schools, CTR. FOI( EDU. REFORM,
(May
6,
2008),
http://www.edreform.com/published_pdf!Bipartisan_Support_
for_Charter_Schools.pdf
39. Teachcrs' unions have bccn among thc strongcst opponcnts of charter schools.
See gcnerally AMERICi\N FEDEI(i\TION OF TEi\CHERS, CHi\RTER SCHOOL LAWS: IJO THEY
MEASUI(E UI'? (1996); see also William Haft, Charter Schools and the Nineteenth
Century Corporation: A Match Made in the Public Interest, :lO ARIZ. ST. L.,J. 1023
(1998), for a discussion of some of thc movemcnt's critics.
10. 20 U.S.C.A §§ 7221, 722:l, 6:l16(b)(8)(A)-(B)(i)(2010).
11. l'rcss ]{c Icase, U .S. Dcpartmcnt of Education, l'residcnt Obama, U .S.
Sccrctary of I•;ducation Duncan Announcc National Compctition to Advancc School
Rcform: Competition to Advancc School Reform Ohama Administration Starts $1.35
Billion "l{ace to thc Top" Compdition, Plcdgcs a Total of $10 Billion for ({eforms (July
21, 2009), http://www.ed.gov/ncws/prcssrclcases/2009/07/07242009.html.
12. PHILi\NTHHOI'Y RoUNilTi\BLE, http://www.philanthropyroundtahlc.org/content.
asp?contcntid=55íl (last visitc>d Oct. 20, 201 O) (a rccent meeting of leading
philanthropists working on charter cducation includcd intcrnational, domestic and
regional grant-makcrs); Scott Olstcr, For!{et Superman, Charter Schools are Waiting
for Oprah. FORTUNE, Scpt. ;)(), 201 O, available at http:/imoncy.cnn.com/2010/09/.10/
ncws/cconomy/waiting_for_sllperman.fortunelindcx.htm.
1:1. History, supra note 21.
11. See Charter Schools: Findin!{ out the facts: At a Glancc, CENTER FOR PUBLIC
EDUCATION, http://www.centcrforpuhliceducation.org/Main-Mcnu/Organizing-a-school!
Charter-schools-Finding-out-thc-faets-At-a-glancc/default.aspx (last visitcd Oct 22.
2010) (thirty perccnt of ali chartcr schools are run hy EM Os and sixtcen pl>rcent of ali
chartcr schools are run by for-profit EMOs).
15. See, e.!{., id .. at figun' I.
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companies are prohibited from holding charters, for-profit
compames may contract with nonprofit charter-holding
organizations to manage facilities, oversee day-to-day
operations, hire and fire teachers and execute the curriculum
in charter schools. 46 Charter schools hire EMOs because the
parties creating a new school often possess no or insufficient
experience in managing schools. 47 Management companies
offer this expertise and help newly formed schools save time
and resources by adopting curricula that have been previously
developed by the EMO, and by benefitting from pooled
purchasing power for essential supplies, as the company
negotiates preferred or discounted prices on beha]f of the
charter through economies of scale. 4 x
II.

THE PROBLEM: lNCOMPLETE LEGAL GUIDANCE TO ENSURE
APPROPRIATE AND ACCOUNTABLE ROLES FOR NONPHOFIT
CHARTER SCHOOLS WHO CONTRACT WITH MANAGEMENT
COMPANIES

From a legal perspective, charter schools occupy a shadowy
terrain between purely "pub]ic" and "private" education, forcing
state legislatures and the courts to develop rules to ensure the
accountability that the public expects of public education, while
permittmg
and
encouraging
the
dynamism
and
experimentation available in autonomous private schools. 49
Over the last two decades, charter schools have become further
complicated by not only crossing public and private boundaries,
but merging nonprofit and for-profit organiz:ational forms m
the provision of education. 50
As previously mentioned, most states have made it
impossible for for-profits to hold a charter directly, but
loopholes remain to permit contracting with for-profits to
manage the day-to-day operations of charter schools. 51 Fears

16. John Morley, For-l'rofit and Nonprofit Char'er Schools: An Agency Costs
Approach, 115 YALE L .•J. 1782, 1785-86 (2006); scc also Conn. su.pm noLl' 16, a L 129-:30.
17. David Walk, How Edumtional Management Compcznics Serve Chartcr 8chools
and Their Studcnts. :32 J .L. & Edu c. 211, 252 (200:l).
18. Jd.
49. Julie F. Mead, fJeuilish fJetails: lúploring Fcatures o/ Chart.cr 8chool Statutes
that 13lur the l'ublic/ l'riuatc fJistinction, 10 HAilV .•J. ON U:c:Js. :l19 (200:l).
50. Morley, supra note 17, at 1788.
51. ld. at 1789-91.
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that for-profit organizations would put profits before education
likely motivated these state legislatures to avoid conferring
charters on for-profit companies directly. The role of for-profit
companies in charter school education has been a touchstone
for many concerns of parents, teachers and other stakeholders
that charter school laws will create a publically-funded forprofit education industry. 52 ln a 2007 report from The Center
on Reinventing Public Education at the University of
Washington, the authors described the "lessons learned" over
more than a decade of charter school business based on
interviews with the leaders of management companies. 53 Far
from reassuring, the research makes no effort to capture the
experience of nonprofit charter school boards (EMO clients) or
local school officials, and reveals an industry that self-reports
finding profits and growth challenging, due, in part, to the
resistance of legislatures, boards and local community
members to permit EMOs to use their packaged curricula and
policies or "scale up" by operating multiple schools. 54 ln
language that this author suspects would raise the hackles of
many charter-granting authorities, legislatures and education
community members, EMOs are encouraged to be more
disciplined about "client acquisition" to reduce the "costs"
associated with shared decision-making, or tailoring preexisting curricula or operations protocols. 55
The obvious strategy of for-profit management companies is
to centralize decision-making, m1mmize nonprofit board
member and community involvement, control the charter
application process, resist requests to alter curricula and
education "models," and simultaneously capitalize on
opportunities for expansion to increase scale and market share
in the geographic region. 56 The result is a charter school that
is incontrovertibly controlled by the management company,
instead of the nonprofit board that received the governmentissued charter for the school.
A recent ninth circuit court of appeals decision interpreting
federal statutc ruled that for-profit charter schools may not
receiVe Elementary and Secondary Education Act or
52.
5:l.
51.
55.
56.

Id.; see also Conn, supra note 16, at 1:31.
NA'I''L CHAR'I'EI{ SCH. lü;::mAIWH PRO.JEC'I', supra note 5, at 7.
Id. at 1-5.
ld at 2:l-26.
Id.
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Individuais with Disabilities Education Act funds. 57 As
enormous revenue sources for charter schools, this ruling puts
further pressure on nonprofit boards. EMOs who could operate
their own for-profit schools in some states, following this
ruling, must work for a non-profit charter school board if they
wish to receive any of these federal funds. As for-profit
companies realize that nonprofit charter schools are their
"meal ticket" for funding from Washington, they will have more
incentive to dominate and control the charter school boards
they ostensibly serve. 5 g
Courts have been called upon to define and confine the
relationships
between
nonprofit
organizations
and
management companies, policing the interaction to ensure that
nonprofits continue to provide oversight and leadership in the
provision of education where for-profit companies are not
permitted to hold charters. 59 It would appear, however, that
potential conflicts of i.nterest, weak oversight, and improper
management company control in the charter school arena go
un-litigated, arguably because of challenges facing plaintiffs to
bring suits (lack of standing and limited causes of action 60 ) and
lack of institutional resources for monitoring or enforcement
(by
state
and
local
government,
charter-conferring
organizations, or attorneys general). A few state legislatures
have amended their original charter school legislation to
respond to the evolving role of for-profit companies working
with charter schools, including defining the roles of boards and
establishing safeguards for nonprofi.t independence. 61
At the federal levei, the relationships between for-profit
management companies and nonprofit charter schools threaten
a nonprofit's tax exempt status. Language from the Internal

57. Ariz. State Bd. for Chartcr Schs. v. U.S. Dcp't of Educ., 161 F.:ld 100:1 (9th
Cir. 2006).
58. Mark D. Evans, An J<;nd to Federal Funding of For-Profit Charter Schools(, 79
U. CoLO. L. HEV. 617, 645-16(2008).
59. See, e.g., Carhondalc An~a Sch. Dist. v. Fell Chartcr Sch., 829 A.2d 100 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 200:l); W. Chcster Arca Sch. Dist. v. Collcgium Charler Sch., 812 A.2d
1172 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Brackbill v. Ron Brown Chartcr Sch., 777 A.2d I :31 (l'a.
Commw. Ct. 2001); Sch. District of York v. Lincoln-Edison Chartcr Sch., 772 A.2d 1015
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
60. Conn, supra note Hi, at 1:n (discussing thc legal barricrs to brinhring claims
against managcment companies undcr uxisting corporatl~ law and statc-crcatud "other
constitucncy" statutes).
61. OHIO i{EV. COill•; ANN. ~ :l:lH.O:l; see Altcrnatiws Unlimited-Spccial, lnc. v.
Ohio Dept. of Educ .. 8Gl N.K2d IG:l (Ohio CL. App. 200()).
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Revenue Service Manual for agency reviewers and a handful of
IRS rulings provide insufficient guidance to nonprofits who
seek to contract with for-profit management companies. 62
My analysis concludes that ex post gap-filling by the courts
and ad hoc amendments by state legislatures are incomplete
remedies to ensure that for-profit companies do not exploit
superior resources and bargaining power to impermissibly
control charter schools where they are not permitted to operate
schools for profit. Clear ex ante rules are essential from the
state legislature to help: (1) charter-granting organizations to
detect when an application made by a nonprofit is merely an
opportunity for an EMO's alter ego; (2) nonprofit boards to
establish themselves with credibility, guide their board activity
and oversight, and prevent conflicts of interest; and, (3)
nonprofit boards structure the contracts they make with
management companies to prevent excessive delegation. After
nearly two decades of charter schools, it is clear that the courts'
decisionallaw and state legislatures' efforts on these issues are
insufficient.
The threats that agreements with for-profit management
companies pose to nonprofit charter schools' tax-exempt status
are under-deterred and infrequently addressed by Lhe IRS and
Department of Treasury. These government bodies should
develop clearer guidelines for nonprofits to follow in their
relationships with EMOs to provide charter school education,
so as to help avoid potential revocation and taxation for excess
benefit transactions among board members and other
interested parties.

III. ARGUMENT
A.

State Legislative and Judicial Gap-Filling

States that permit charter schools can be divided into two
legal regimes: "restrictive" and "permissive." Under the latter,
state statutes are either silent as to whether charter schools
must operate as nonprofits, or they explicitly permit for-profit

62. See IRM 1\.76.8.8 (.July 1, 200:l), auailablc at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/
irm_0!\-076-008.html#dCk619.
Sec also, 2001 ms NSAR 20010799R, 2001 WL
:Wl18860 (Aug. :n, 2001); 2001 INS NSAR 20010822R, 2001 WL 3<1818873 (Oct. 25,
2001); 2000 ms NSAR 2000075:ll{, 2000 WL :H5!\8:l59 (Oct. :30, 2000); 1997 IRS NSAR
o:l91, 1997 WL a:ls1 0217.
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charter schools. 63 This means that a for-profit company could
receive a charter and operate a publicly funded school for
profit. Arizona is an example of a state with "permissive"
charter schoollaws. 64
This paper addresses "restrictive" states, which require that
a charter school operate as a nonprofit. Ohio and Pennsylvania
are examples of "restrictive" states, where for-profit
management companies have flourished and there has been
comparatively significant litigation and legislative action
concerning their role. Although, the issues of conflict of
interest, board oversight, delegation, control and enforcement
that emerge in "restrictive" regimes overlap in many ways, the
discussion that follows attempts to break out three general
areas where state legislatures and courts have grappled with
tensions emerging from EMO agreements: (1) Conflict of
Interest and Board Oversight; (2) Nonprofit Board Duties and
Delegation; and (3) Standing, Enforcement and Attorneys
General.

1. Conflict of interest and board oversight
Because nonprofit organizations are intended to provide
oversight of the school's operations and lead its governance in
"restrictive" states, some legislatures havc amended their laws
to clarify nonprofit board members' roles and to rcduce
opportunities for conflicts of interest. Conflicts emerge where
there is overlap in representation on the board of the nonprofit
and members of the EMO, or where there may be improperly
close relationships between the two. Such ties threaten the
accountability of charter schools by creating opportunities for
self-dealing. While there are very few reportcd cases that
address board oversight or self-dealing among charter school
board members and management companies, Ohio offers an
example.
ln Board of Trustees Sabis International School v.
Montgomery, the existing charter school board of directors
brought an action, based on due process and equal protection
theories, as well as state law contract and fraud claims, against
the state charter-granting body, the school supcrintendant, the

6;i. Mead, supra note 50, at :362.
64. See Amz. HEV. STAT. ANN. ~ 15-1 il1 (A) (:WJO).
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attorney general, and the former board chair. 65 The claims
were based on the alleged failure of the state defendants "to
take certain action to protect" the nonprofit charter school from
the "harmful" agreement with the management company
entered into by the former board members. 66 The existing
nonprofit board had sought help from the state in mediating a
contract dispute between the school and the EMO under an
arbitration clause in the school's charter agreement with the
government. 67
Conflict of interest on the nonprofit board had brought
about the problems between the school and the management
company. The former board chairwoman, who had led the
decision to hire the company, had multiple family ties to the
company's leadership. (Her uncle founded the company and
another relative was the current president.) As the board
chair, she had been the sole board member to negotiate and
sign all agreements with the management company, including
a promissory note and a lease agreement, pursuant to which,
the nonprofit paid the management company approximately
$98,000 per month for use of the school building. 68 When
additional board members joined, the chairwoman was ousted
and the remaining board members terminated the contract
with the management company following the end of the current
school year.
The management company claimed there were legitimate
"disagreements over how to draw the line between the
[nonprofit board'sj involvement with the school" and its own. 69
The company complained of the [board's] "micro-management
of the school." 70
This case is an example of the need for clear rules to guide
nonprofit charter school boards with regard to both self-dealing
and oversight of management companies running the day-today school operations. ln addition to the obvious conflict in
hiring the company, the contract in Sabis provided for the

6fi.
2002).
66.
67.
68.
G9.

Bel. of Trs. Sabis lnt'l Sch. v. Montgomery, 205 F. Supp. 2d

ld. at í\12.
ld. at í\10.
Jd.
Jd. at 810-11.
70. ld.

8~15

(S.D. Ohio
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EMO to retain control of all of the school's financial recordso 71
This made subsequent efforts by the non-interested board
members to exert oversight over the company difficulto 72
The court in Sabis ultimately dismissed all claims against
the defendants and stated that the Ohio superintendant of
education had no obligation under the charter school statute to
"monitor or report on a school's service provider lmanagement
company]o" 73 ln a clear effort to hold the board squarely
responsible for the failures of the school, the court wagged its
finger at the plaintiffs, admonishing them that: "neither [the
superintendant] nor anyone from her office encouraged the
[b]oard to enter into the o o o [a]greement in the first placeo The
[b]oard made that decision independently, as it is permitted to
do under Ohio law, and it cannot now fault the Stateo" 74 The
result of the suit was that the charter school board had no
remedy against anyone (including its self-dealing former board
chair), and it had no more guidance than before the suit as to
how to exert the kind of oversight and control the legislature
and the court required of ito
Soon after this case, the Ohio state legislature passed a
conflict of interest amendment to its charter school
legislationo 75 Under the revised statutory scheme, nonprofit
charter school boards must include "not less than five
individuais who are not owners or employees, or immediate
relatives of owners or employees, of any for-profit firm that
operates or manages a school." 76 A more recently revised
version of the law goes even further to root-out conflict of
interest, stating," [N]o present or former member, or
immediate relative of a present or former member, of the
[nonprofit charter school board] shal1 be an owner, employee, or
consultant of any nonprofit or for-profit operator of a
community school, unless at least one year has elapsed since
the conclusion of the person's membershipo" 77
Nothing in the statute, however, outlines the terms that
boards should negotiate in contracts with management

71.
72.
7il.
71.
75.

fd.

ld. at 811.
ld. at 851-52 (interpreting OHIO I{!.: v. COLJE ÀNN. § :l:ll1.12).
ld. at 852.
ld. (referencing the fornwr lnnguagP of OHIO lü:v. Com: Àê\IN § :l:l11.02(E)).
76. ld.
77. OHIO Iü:v. COim i\NN. § :J:n 1.02(E)(:l) (2009).
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compames, or defines the respective roles of boards and
compames to prevent "micro-managing" or inappropriate
delegation. Should the state permit the contract to include any
terms to which the parties agree where savvy management
companies, who have explicit strategies to limit client
involvement, are negotiating with nonprofit charter school
boards, who may be made up of community members, parents
and teachers? This assumes an equity in bargaining power
that does not exist. Arguably, apart from the conflict of
interest issue in board membership, the charter school in Sabis
should not have become the recipient of a promissory note from
the management company, nor become its lessee.
These
ancillary relationships reduced the ability of the board to
negotiate with the company from a position of strength solely
as a client or customer, and provided disincentives to
challenging any of the company's decisions or practices.
Nonetheless, EMOs routinely obtain and contrai school
facilities, using "debt and real estate to bind schools to it."n
Statutes that more explicitly detail the scope of the
relationship between nonprofit boards and EMOs and perhaps
provide model contract language, would have guided the board
to exert more effective control in Sabis.
Alternatively,
removing real estate from the relationship altogether may be
more effective. Cities like Washington, D.C. and New York
work with charter schools to obtain buildings, which means
that management companies do not control this significant
asset. 79

2. Charter school nonprofit board duties and delegation
Pennsylvania has the most charter school litigation of any
state. ~o These cases explore the appropriate level of control a
charter school board should exert over a management
company, and at what point the nonprofit has become nothing
more than a shell for the for-profit. ln Carbondale Area School
District v. Fell Charter School, a community of residents
created a nonprofit organization and applied for a charter so
they could keep a school in their neighborhood after the state
authority had closed the local public school and consolidated

7H. Strom, supra notP 2.
79. ld.
HO. Ml'ad. supra note 50.
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the district. 81 ln its application, the community stated that it
planned to contract with the for-profit management company
Mosaica Education Inc. 82 to oversee the day-to-day operation of
the charter school. The state authority denied the application
because, inter alia, it found that the community nonprofit
board would be "nothing more than a rubber stamping body"
for Mosaica. 83 Specifically, the state authority suggested that
the nonprofit board had delegated an impermissible number of
responsibilities to Mosaica, including:
(1) preparation of the annual budget, (2) maintenance and
retention of all financial and student records, (3)
recommendation and enforcement of rules, regulations, and
procedures. . . (4) solicitation and receipt of grants and
donations ... (5) selection, evaluation, assignment, discipline,
supervision, and transferring of [the school's] personnel, (6)
determination of [the school's] staffing levcl, (7) selcction and
employment of the [school's] principal, and (8) providing [thc
school] with Mosaica's copyrighted Paragon curriculum. 84

The community nonprofit appealed to the state charter
school appeal board, which reversed the lower state authority's
decision and directed it to grant the charter. 85 The state
authority refused and petitioned the state court for review. 86
The court looked to the Pennsylvania charter school statute~0
using the analysis it developed in West Chester Area School
District v. Collegium Charter School, which involved another
charter school managed by Mosaica. 88 The court stated:
Clearly . . . the legislature did not want to entrust the
management and operation of the charter school itself to
entities seeking to make money from the schools management
and operation; rathcr, that powcr is granted to the charter

81. Carhondale Area Sch. Dist. v. Fell Charter Sch., 82!1 A.2d -100, -102 (l'a.
Commw. Ct. 200:l).
82. Mosaica Education is a for-profít charter school "opcrator" whose current
executive managemcmt is made up of private equity anel management consultant
alumni. MOSAICA EllUCA'I'lclN, http://mosaicaeducation.com/ahout-mosaica/.
8:3. Carbondale Arca Sch. /Jist., 152!1 A.2d at -106.
8-1. Id.
85. Jd. at 402.
156. Jd. at 402-0:3.
87. l'A. CONS. STAT. ANN § 17-1719-i\(;j) (Wcst 2009).
88. W. Chester Arca Sch. Dist. v. Colkgium Charter Sch., 760 A.2d -1G2 (l'a.
Commw. Ct. 2000).
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school's board of trustees who ... have a single purpose to
promote the interests of pupils. 89
The issue, according to the court, is whether the charter
school's board will have a "real and substantial authority and
responsibility for the educational decisions, and the teachers
are employees of the charter school itself. 90
Ultimately, the court affirmed the appeals board, holding
that the delegation of administration outlined in the Mosaica
agreement was permissible, and that the charter would not
prevent the nonprofit board from "exercising ultimate control of
the charter school." 91 The Carbondale court's holding mirrors
that of several other Pennsylvania cases challenging the
delegation of charter school control to for-profit management
companies. 92 ln all of these cases, the suspicions of local school
districts that refused to grant charters to nonprofits working
with management companies were dismissed by administrative
boards of appeals and the courts.
These cases are illustrative of the dissonance between the
legislature's expectations and the realities of many charter
schools.
While nonprofit boards are intended to promote
accountability and play an active role in ensuring profit
motives do not undermine educational goals, Carbondale, and
the other Pennsylvania cases, stand for the proposition that
boards may relinquish a school's actual fiscal, personnel, and
even curricular decision-making to a for-profit company, as
long as the contract states that the nonprofit board maintains
"ultimate control." 93 These decisions are especially revealing
considering that the Pennsylvania charter schoollaw is robust,
and includes specific language about the required sphere of

89. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 829 A.2d at 102.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Sch. Dist. of York v. Lincoln-Edison Charter Sch., 798 A.2d 295 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2002) (affirming appeals board revcrsal of school district and dinding the grant of
a charter to a nonprofit contracting with the Edison School lnc. management
company); Brackbill v. Hon Brown C h arte r Sch., 777 A.2d 181 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001)
(affirming appcals board revcrsal of school district and directing the grant of a charter
to a nonproflt contracting with Mosaica); W Chester Area Sch. Dist., 760 A.2d 452 (l'a.
Commw. Ct. 2000) (affirming appcals board rcvcrsal of school district that conduded
nonprofit was not an independcnt, pubJic, non-profit corporation, but in fi1ct, a profitmaking condnit for the managcment company Mosaica, and directing the grant of the
chartcr).
9:3. Carbondale Area S'ch. J)ist., 829 A.2d at 107; see also !3rachbill, 777 A.2d at
1:37.
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nonprofit charter school board responsibilities. 94 Nonctheless,
the courts refuse to move beyond the scope of the contract
language to determine and ensure that actual board activities
will not, in fact, act as a "rubber stamp" for the management
company.
3. Standing, enforcement and attorneys general
'rhe relatively small amount of charter school litigation in
"restrictive" states, including Pennsylvania and Ohio, may be
related to limits with regard to who may bring suits. ln
Pennsylvania, the school districts that refuse to grant a charter
have standing to challenge the nonprofit charter school and its
for-profit management company if the school subsequently
wins the right to a charter on appeal. Other constituencies
have sought to challenge EMOs by challenging thc nonprofits
that hire them to manage their schools. 'rax-payers 95 and
neighboring school districts, 96 who have argued that charter
grants to nonprofit groups which have contracted with EMOs
were improper or that their funds are being diverted to,
essentially for-profit schools, have failed because courts have
refused to grant standing. Courts have held that charter
school statutes prohibit even the state department of education
from bringing suit to enforce the obligations of charter school
boards. 97 'rhis limits the enforcement power of the courts to
actions brought by charter-granting school districts, which
appear to be uniformly overrulcd by the Pennsylvania courts to
date.

94. The l'ennsylvania statute reads:
Powcrs of hoard of trustec>s (a) The board of trustL•es of a charter school shall havc
thc authority to decide mattcrs related to thc opcration of the schonl, including.
but not limited to, hudge>ting, curriculum and opNating proccdures, subjcct to thc>
school's charter. Tlw hoard shall havc the authority to cmploy, dischargt• anel
contract with necessary professional and nonprofcssional crnploycs lsicl subjcct to
thP school's charter and the provisions of this artick .... (c) Thc hoard of trustccs
shall comply with thc act of .July :1, 1!c! H() (P.L. :1HH, No. H4), known as tlw
'Sunshinc> Act.'

§ 17-1716-A
95. See, e.g., Fairficld Arca Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Org. for Childrcn, lnc., 8:l7 i\.:2d 6·14
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 200:l); /Jrackbill, 777 A.2d 1:31:. W. Chester Arca Sch. /Jist., 760 A.2d
452.
96. Fairfield, s:n A2d at 644; !'a. Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. í':oghy, H02 A.2d 6 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002).

l'A. CONS. STAT. ÀNN.

97. Zoghy, 802 A2d 6.
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Traditionally, enforcement of nonprofit law has been the
purview of the state attorney general. 98 ln Ohio, however, the
courts recently ruled that charter schools, which must be run
as nonprofits as a matter of state law, are immune from
attorney general oversightY 9 While the suit did not include a
for-profit management company, it did involve claims that the
nonprofit charter school board was not meeting its obligations.
The Ohio attorney general brought an action against the board
based on a charitable trust theory, alleging that the board
failed to meet "fiduciary duties with regard to the public
moneys it has received." 100 According to the attorney general,
the arrangement between the state, the charter school board,
and the public was structured as a trust. "The [s]tate (settlor)
provides funds to [the charter school] (the trustees) for the
benefit of ... students and the general public (the
beneficiary)." 101 The action sought to either terminate the trust
or replace the board members. 102
The court ruled that as a charter school, the organization
was no longer merely a nonprofit, but a "politicai subdivision
and a legislatively-created public school falling within the
state's system of public education and the oversight of the
Department of Education." 103 As such, it was not subject to the
oversight of the state attorney general. Without attorney
general oversight, the charter schools of Ohio are subject only
to the control of their sponsoring district board of education
(like Pennsylvania), and parents, who may vote with their feet
by removing students from the school.
Outside of nonprofit law, state contract law might provide
nonprofit board members a framework for exerting control over
overbearing EMOs. However, upon quick reflection, it is
apparent this is unlikely. Where EMOs have created boards
with members whose interests align with the EMOs, the
nonprofit charter board is not likely to sue to enforce the terms

9H. See .Jen•my Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Dircctors' Du.ty of
Obedience, :lO CAIWOZO L. i{EV. 1677, 1697-98 (2009) (asserting that only state
attorm,ys genmal have standing in cases involving a nonprofit dirl•ctor's fiduciary
hreach).
99. State ex rei. ]{ogers v. New Choices Cmty. Sch., No. 2:3031, 2009 WL 2857360,
at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2009).
100. Id. at *:l-1.
101. ld. at *1.
102. ld. at *1-5.
1O:l. ld. at *9.
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of the agreement where they upset an arrangement that serves
the EMO. If, as in Ohio, the courts have found charter schools
and their boards immune from attorney general investigation,
there are no legal options to protect the charter school from
becoming a mere alter ego of the EMO.

B.

Risks Facing Nonprofit Charter Schools Under the
Internal Revenue Code

ln addition to state law prohibitions, the relationship
between a nonprofit charter school board and its for-profit
management company has implications for the nonprofit's taxexempt status under federal law. 104 According to its manual,
the IRS recognizes the complex and interdependent
relationships that may exist in charter school formation. 105
When considering the tax-exempt status of new or existing
nonprofits that are working with for-profit compames, it
cautions examiners that:
Organizations . . . operating schools under a charter
agreement, may have little or no experience in managing or
establishing a school and often contract for a myriad of
services including, among others, curriculum design, financial
management, office management, and special education
services. Comprehensive school management companies are a
growing presence in the educational sector and offer a
complete program of both management and educational
services. For a charter school to establish exemption under
IRC § 50l(c)(3), whether it contracts out some or all of the
services required to operate, it must establish that it is
organized and operated for exclusively charitable purposes
and not for the benefit of private management companies
and/or for service providers. 106

The IRS is interested in whether the charter school board
remains in control and continues to exercise its fiduciary
responsibility to the school. 107 A board appointed or dominated
101. ,JAM~;s ,J. F!SHMA:-l & ST!WHEN SCIIWARTZ, NONI'IUWIT O!U:ANIZATIONS CASES
AND MATE){IALS 596 (:ld ed. 200fí).
105.

lRS MANUAL 1. 76.8.8-CHAWI'I•;R SCHOOLS (.July 1,200:3) WL (I{]J\-IHM).

106.

Il{S MANL'AL 1. 76.8.8.1 (:1)-CHAI{'I'I<:I{ SCHOOLS EXI·;MI'T STSI'lJS (,Ju]y

1. 200:3)

WL (lUA-mM).
107. TE!WY BERKOVSKY, ÂNilREW M~X:OSH, DimltA COWEN & DAVIIJ DAUME,
CHAiiTim ScHooLs, EXJ<:MPT Oit<:ANIZA'I'IONS CON'I'INlJING l'IHWI•:ssioNAL EIJUCATlON
(Cl'E) TECHNICAL INS'I'IWCTION l'H<J<:i{J\M FY 2000, 2000 WL :11102222 (l.R.S.).

available at http://www.irs.gov/publirs-tegdeotopicjOO.pdf.
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by a management company raises questions as to whether the
school will be operated for the benefit of the management
company. 10 x The IRS will not grant tax-exempt status where a
nonprofit charter school board has delegated its responsibility
and ultimate accountability for the school's operations to a forprofit management company. 109

I.

Charitable purpose, delegation and conflict of interest

There are only four published IRS Service Advice Reviews
("SARs") that discuss nonprofit charter school relationships
with for-profit management companies, but the discussions are
searching and indicate that the IRS has much higher
standards for schools than the courts under state charter
school legislation. 110 The IRS decisions also reveal more
scrutiny of the history and players behind the creation of the
nonprofit charter school, as well as the board's actual ability to
operate in light of the contract with the management
company. 111 Perhaps it is revealing that all four of the SARs
deny tax-exempt status to the nonprofit schools because of
their connections with management companies. 112
The
decisions focus on three areas: (1) the management company's
role in creation of the nonprofit and its board independence, (2)
the terms of the agreement with the for-profit and the degree of
delegation, and (3) the benefits flowing to the for-profit
company.
The earliest decision appears to be from 1997, denying taxexempt status to a kindergarten through sixth grade charter
school with a "business and entrepreneurial" theme. 113 The
IRS relied on the fact that the management company's
principal incorporated the nonprofit charter school, established
its board, made the application to the state for the grant of a
charter, and established the scope of the curriculum. 114

ld.
109. ld.
110. 8ee, c.g, 2001 IRS NSAR 20010822R, 2001 WL :3181887::3 (Oct. 25, 2001);
2001 ms NSAR 200107991{, 2001 WL 81818860 (Aug. :n, 2001); ll{S NSi\1{
2000075:m, 2000 WL :H518:l59 (Oct. :lO, 2000); 1997 Il{S NSAR O:l91, 1997 WL
:l:l810217.
111. ld.
112. ld.
11:l. 1997ll{SNSAI{O:l91, 1997WL:l:l810217.
111. ld.
10H.
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Members of the charter school's board included the
management company principal. 115
The IRS also detailed the terms of the management
agreement, and deemed that the nonprofit had abdicated its
oversight role by permitting the management company to
oversee: curriculum development and the acquisition of
instructional materiais, supplies and equipment;
all
extracurricular activities; hiring, firing and professional
development of personnel; maintenance of the school facilities,
including transportation and food; all school "business"
opportunities and finances, and "any other function necessary
or expedient for the administration of the school." 116 The IRS
also appeared suspicious of the terms of renewal, which were
automatic on an annual basis and did not require meeting any
specific performance measures or other obligations of the
nonprofit board. 117
Termination could only occur if the
nonprofit board gave written notice in advance of the new
school year. ln addition to the contract to manage the school,
the management company and the charter school were further
entangled in a lease agreement and promissory note that made
the nonprofit a tenant of and debtor to the management
company. 11 s
The IRS concluded that the "business and entrepreneurial"
charter school was created with a "dual purpose of operating an
educational organization and providing business to" the
management company. 119 It further held that even though the
original board members (who were clearly interested parties
with ties to the management company) had been replaced, the
"new board" of the nonprofit had been appointed by the old
board, and demonstrated no increased independence. 120 The
IRS noted that the "new board" had taken no steps to review
the management agreement, and appeared to be no more than
a "rubberstamp of the status quo." 121 ln a final blow, the IRS
stated that "even assuming. . . [the nonprofit board of
directors] are independent, ... the management agreement

115.
116.
117.
llR.
119.
120.
121.

!ri.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
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gives [the for-profit] impermissible control of [the school's]
operations. . . . [and] in effect, handed the keys [of its]
operations to a for-profit management company, one which has
been intimately tied to [it] since [its] formation." 122
Perhaps the most insightful part of the IRS decision is the
acknowledgement of the business model behind charter school
management companies that drives its relationships with
nonprofit boards. The IRS noted that in the case of the
"business and entrepreneurial" charter school, the benefit
clearly flowed to the for-profit, as the company was able to
"create its own customer, eliminate competition, ...
experiment and gain competence with [the] students, ... [and]
improve its intellectual property" by setting up the nonprofit
and negotiating the contract to run the school. 123 This was
evidence that the benefits flowing to the for-profit were more
than merely "incidental," 124 and prevented the nonprofit
charter school from attaining tax-exempt status.
The other cases are variations on the sarne themes. ln the
decision to deny tax-exempt status to a charter school for the
"deaf and hard of hearing," the IRS discussed the issue of
conflict of interest and "arms-length" dealings, explicitly. 125 ln
this case, the management company's principal (who
apparently created a company that specialized in the education
of the deaf) helped to incorporate the nonprofit charter school
and sat on the nonprofit's board at the time it signed the
management contract with his company. 126 Incredulous, the
IRS noted that the lack of board policies on the issue, and the
terms of the contract (which were "general" and "silent as to
how the budget will be negotiated") reveal that there was no
attempt to operate at "arms-length." 127 lndeed, the IRS was so
troubled by the language of the contract, which made no
mention of the charitable nature of the school to be managed,
that it suggested the board had permitted the company "to
maximize profit" at the expense of the school. 12 R The IRS found

122.
12:l.
121.
125.
126.
127.
128.

ld.
ld.
ld.
2ooo ms NSi\1{ 2oooo7s:m. 2000 WL :l15S:l59 (Oct.
ld
ld.
ld.

ao.
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that the nonprofit had become a captive, powerless party to a
"one-sided" "adhesion contract" with its founder's company. 129
ln two cases, a management company was contractually
authorized not only to manage the school, but to renegotiate
the school's charter with the charter-granting government
organization or sponsor. 130 This reduced the nonprofit board's
role to merely not terminating the annual agreement with the
management company, as no other board activity appeared to
be required. 131 Without notice from the board, the company
would continue indefinitely to manage all finances, run school
operations, and ensure a valid government charter by
executing the renewal with the authorities, when required by
statute, to keep public funds flowing. 132
ln another decision, the IRS held tha t a nonprofit charter
school, developed as an adjunct to a newly planned housing
community, had "retained little, if any, ability to create an
identity for [itselfj by allowing [the management company] to
act as a buffer between [the school] and the people [it was]
supposed to be serving: students, parents, teachers and the
general public." 133 ln this case, the board had "contracted
away" the obligations to create marketing plans and handle
public relations for the school, create and manage parentteacher programs, as well as dictate student curriculum and
instruction. 134 The sarne agreement included a non-compete
clause, preventing any of the employees of the school (who
worked for the company) from working for the nonprofit for one
year. 135 This restricted the oversight of the nonprofit board
enormously, with the termination of the agreement resulting in
the need to completely reassemble the school's staff. 136 The
IRS characterized the relationship between the nonprofit and
the management company as being like a "franchise," where
the nonprofit board was controlled by the management
company, which dictated everything about how the school

129. Id.
1il0. 2001 IRS NSi\R 20010822R, 2001 WL :H81887il (Oct. 2fí. 2001); 2001
NSAR 20010799R, 2001 WL i\1818860 (i\u[.;. :n, 2001).
1êl1. 2001 IRS NSi\1{ 200108221{, 2001 WL :l18H\87:l (Oct. 25, 2001)
1:l2. 2001 ms NSi\R 20010799R, 2001 WL :H81886o (i\ug. :n. :won.
1:3:1. Id
1:31. Id.
1:35. Iâ.
1:lG. Id.

ms
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would function, and from whom the board would have to
purchase all the related curriculum and materiais. 137 The
contract made the company indispensible to the very existence
of the school.
2.

Excess benefit transactions

None of the IRS opinions impose tax liability because the
Service does not grant tax-exempt status to any of the charter
schools.
However, one opinion discussed the threat of
intermediate sanctions for excess benefit transactions in light
of the arrangements between the school and its management
company. 13 R According to the decision, the "deaf and hard of
hearing" school's officers, directors and management company
would h ave likely faced tax liability under Section 4958, 139
because of the management company's "substantial influence
over" the school, its "manipulation of [the] contract
negotiations" and the "excessive nature of the benefits flowing
to" the company. 14
Considering the potential for excess
benefit transactions in the charter school setting where there is
board overlap between the school and its management
company, it is regrettable that the IRS has not addressed the
issue in its published guidelines for nonprofit charter
schools. 141

°

IV. CONCLUSION
The number of charter schools continues to grow in many
states. 142 For-profit education management companies will
continue to serve this market. However, lessons learned by
management companies over the last two decades reveal that
operating charter schools is "more difficult and more expensive
than [companies] anticipated." 143 This is, according to the
companies, a result of "charter school opponents [who] have
been able to impose high politica} and legal costs on these
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organizations." 144 Economies of scale have driven industry
consolidation, as companies like Mosaica, Chancellor Beacon
Academies, Charter Schools USA, Edison Schools, and White
Hat Management have displaced other, smaller management
companies, and now operate multiple school sites, often in
different parts of the country, from a centralized office. 145 This
is not unlike a franchise business model. ln the face of
shrinking profits and scrutiny from politicai leaders and the
press, 146 management companies are becoming more selective
about "client acquisition." 147 This does not bode well for
nonprofit charter school boards.
For-profit management
companies will always seek ways to maximize control to ensure
efficiency and profit. This includes driving the creation of a
charter school from application to contract negotiation to
subsequent charter renewal, where possible. Indeed, doing so,
according to management company leaders themselves, 1s
essential to success. 14 R
ln light of the negotiating power and motivations of
management companies, the threat of nonprofit charter school
board capture or inappropriate delegation comes into sharp
focus. Because courts have shown themselves unwiJling to
proscribe clear rules and appear to be generally overly
permissive with regard to charter school boards, more guidance
must flow from the legislative and executive branches. State
charter schoollaw and IRS guidelines should be strengthened,
clarified and harmonized to promote stronger board autonomy
and accountability. The opportunity for abuse, in light of the
limitations for oversight and enforcement from government
and other parties, demands express directives for charter
schools.
The consequences of failure to govern can be
catastrophic, including revocation of tax-exemption, imposition
of tax liability, revocation of charter, and the loss of public
trust, and therefore call for ex ante rules to guide board activity
at every stage.
The unintended consequences of increased rule making may
be to chill the project of charter school creation, however it will
strengthen the (arguably reduced number of) organizations
ld.
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that are granted charters by making them less vulnerable to
for-profit contrai, and resulting state or federal sanction.
Critics of further rule-making argue that freeing charter
schools from many of the regulations that constrain traditional
public schools is a central precept of the movement that
promotes innovation and experimentation.
But, where
management companies bring an existing "tested" and allinclusive "product" to charter schools (including facilities, staff
and curriculum), it would seem that some increased regulation
does little to undermine "innovation."
Specifically, state charter school laws should, at a
minimum, include the following directives:
(1) Specify non-delegable duties for nonprofit boards,
including fiscal management and maintenance of financial
record-keeping that a contracting EMO may not conduct;
(2) Require charter school boards to adopt conflict of
interest I self-dealing policies for board membership that
prevent board members who are employees or have any
financial ties to a contracting EMO;
(3) Require the nonprofit board (and prohibit the
management company) to seek state charter renewal;
(4) Prohibit certain terms in agreements between charter
school boards and management companies, including autorenewal without performance-based outcomes and board active
review and decision-making;
(5) Prohibit non-compete clauses for teachers and charter
school staff when they are employees of the management
company;
(6) Prohibit or restrict ancillary agreements for loans and
facilities that entangle charter school boards with management
companies and diminish incentive and opportunity for active
oversight; and,
(7) Require boards to conduct a review and reveal any
conflict of interest between board members and a contracting
EMO before a charter is granted or renewed to avoid boards
becoming management companies' alter egos.
ln addition, the IRS should provide detailed guidance,
perhaps in an updated Technical lnstruction Program, that
summarizes its SARs to date and elaborates on less flagrant
and extreme activities of nonprofits and management
companies to help charter schools attain and retain their
nonprofit status, as well as avoid tax liability for excess benefit
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transactions. The Service should address the creation of "shell"
nonprofits by management companies, as well as less egregious
relationships. Charter schools need to understand how to
structure relationships with a for-profit management company,
and specifically which functions the IRS will require them to
retain. Failing to do so leaves charter school boards in a
perilous position, simultaneously under-prepared to negotiate
with the management company, and the party who bears the
risk for failure to comply with IRS obligations for tax-cxcmpt
status.

